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A diathesis-stress perspective of obsessive–compulsive symptoms (OCS) predicts
that exposure to adverse events and personality dispositions jointly influence
OCS. Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) model of personality posits that, faced with
challenging circumstances, individuals with a high sensitivity to punishment (SP)
will be more prone to OCS because they cannot avoid the downward spiral into
anxiety. The current study investigates OCS severity in relation to lifetime expo-
sure to adverse events (AE), SP, and sensitivity to reward (SR) in 122 nonclinical
adults. The results indicate that OCS severity is predicted by AE, SP and SR.
Interestingly, the impact of adverse experiences is moderated by SR and not SP.
These findings suggest that: (1) exposure to adverse events and SP are indepen-
dent OCS risk factors, and (2) exposure to adverse events is more critical for
reward dependent people. This is discussed in light of responsibility and ‘not just
right experiences’ in OCS, along with the role of impulsivity in the obsessive-
compulsive disorder spectrum.
■ Keywords: negative life events, obsessive–compulsive disorder, anxiety,
impulsivity, reward drive, diathesis-stress model
A diathesis-stress model of obsessive-compulsive symptoms (OCS) would posit that
maladaptive beliefs (e.g., heightened sense of responsibility) interact with negative
life events in the onset and development of obsessive-compulsive reactions
(Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1981). This theoretical perspective dates back to
Bleuler and Freud (1893–1895), who described the emergence of OCS in a person
suffering from ‘post-traumatic hysteria’. Yet, in more recent studies on OCS, situa-
tional factors have often been neglected in favor of cognitive appraisal dysfunctions
(e.g., Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2009).
A small number of recent publications have suggested a positive relationship
between traumatic exposure and OCS severity. For instance, Cromer, Schmidt, and
Murphy (2007b) examined the contribution of challenging life circumstances in the
expression of OCS in 265 obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, 54% of
whom endorsed at least one traumatic life experience. The association between
trauma and OCS severity remained significant even after age, OCD age-of-onset,
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comorbidity, and depression were accounted for. These findings were replicated in
other OCD samples (Cromer, Schmidt, & Murphy, 2007a), in OCS prone nonclini-
cal individuals (Coles & Horng, 2006; Coles, Pietrefesa, Schofield, & Cook, 2008),
as well as in patients suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Sasson et
al., 2005; Tuerk, Grubaugh, Hamner, & Foa, 2009). The same conclusions were
drawn for different types of negative life incidents, from extremely upsetting events
in adulthood (e.g., high-combat experiences; De Silva & Marks, 2001; Tuerk et al.,
2009) to childhood abuse and neglect (Lochner et al., 2002; Mathews, Kaur, &
Stein, 2008). Even if more equivocal results have also been published (Grabe et al.,
2008; Huppert et al., 2005), the data are generally supportive of the assumption that
adverse life events tend to be associated with an increase in OCS severity. While
this association has been found to be moderate in size (correlations ranging from .14
to .23; Coles & Horng, 2006; Coles et al., 2008; Cromer et al., 2007a, 2007b), its
crucial role has been incorporated in the most influential cognitive models of OCD
(Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1999). In accordance with the diathesis-stress perspec-
tive, these models postulate that adverse events do not directly lead to OCS, but
rather indirectly through cognitive appraisal.
In the last 20 years, a diversity of OCD-specific maladaptive appraisals has been
identified. These include a heightened sense of responsibility (Salkovskis, Shafran,
Rachman, & Freeston, 1999) or a tendency toward perfectionism (Frost &
Steketee, 1997). OCD patients have been shown to score high not only on OCD-
specific maladaptive appraisals, but also on more general cognitive-evaluation biases
related to, for instance, neuroticism (Samuel et al., 2000), or trait anxiety (Hoehn-
Saric, McLeod, & Hipsley, 1995). This is in accordance with the presupposition
that people suffering from OCS show an anxiety bias in information processing in
which events are appraised as overly threatening (Nestadt et al., 2001).
This well-established conceptualisation of OCD as an anxiety disorder has
recently been challenged (Storch, Abramowitz, & Goodman, 2008). It has been
suggested that OCS may be associated with an inability to inhibit a repetitive domi-
nant response (e.g., checking, washing) that is better captured by impulsivity (Bartz
& Hollander, 2006). In agreement with this position, OCD patients compared with
individuals suffering from other forms of anxiety presented a specific deficit in the
capacity to inhibit a prepotent response (Van der Linden, Ceschi, Zermatten,
Dunker, & Perroud, 2005). Moreover, OCD patients (especially tic-prone patients)
reported a higher score of impulsivity compared to patients presenting other anxiety
disorders (Summerfeldt, Hood, Antony, Richter, & Swinson, 2004). However, a
recent study of 330 undergraduate students provided only partial support to the
association between OCS and impulsivity (Sulkowski et al., 2009). Analogous
mixed findings were also published by Ray Li and Chen (2007). Given the difficulty
defining the construct of impulsivity, these inconsistencies might be accounted for
by the heterogeneity of impulsivity definitions and measures used in studies. In sum,
the literature supports a diathesis-stress model of OCS whereby the role of adverse
events may be modulated by anxious and, possibly, impulsive dispositions.
Impulsivity is a multidimensional construct composed of several dimensions
(e.g., Enticott & Ogloff, 2006) supported by specific executive and motivational
mechanisms (e.g., Gay, Rochat, Billieux, d’Acremont, & Van der Linden, 2008). In
the context of OCS, at least two levels of impulsivity deserve attention. The first
level is motivational (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2002) and refers to constructs such as
approach behaviours (e.g., sensitivity to reward, behaviour activation system, posi-
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tive affects, weak fear system, extraversion) and withdrawal behaviours (e.g., sensi-
tivity to punishment, behaviour inhibition system, negative affects, activated fear
system, neuroticism). The second level is executive and concerns self-control capac-
ities based on executive processes (e.g., prepotent response inhibition, cognitive
switching ability). In this perspective, Dawe, Gullo, and Loxton (2004) indicate
that impulsivity-related behaviours often rely upon either a reward drive (i.e., the
sensitivity to unconditioned and conditioned reward stimuli, which mainly relate to
automatic-motivational processes), or a rash impulsivity (i.e., the tendency to engage
in rash and spontaneous behaviours associated with a lack of consideration of future
consequences, which mainly depends on controlled-executive processes). Taking
into account this distinction, it appears that the majority of studies that found a
relationship between impulsivity and OCS have used measures that better capture
the rash impulsiveness dimension of impulsivity rather than its reward drive dimen-
sion (e.g., Summerfeldt et al., 2004; Van der Linden et al., 2005; Zermatten & Van
der Linden, 2008). In fact, the relationship between OCS and reward drive remains
poorly investigated.
In this context, Gray’s personality model, which distinguishes between anxiety
driven and impulsivity driven attitudes is of interest for further exploring the rela-
tionships between OCS and reward drive-related (or motivational) aspects of
impulsivity (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). The two main dimensions of Gray’s
model reflect individual differences in sensitivity to punishment (SP) and sensitiv-
ity to reward (SR). The SP, which taps into the construct of the ‘Behavioural
Inhibition System’ (BIS), is associated with anxiety and acquires behavioural con-
trol in response to danger, frustration, and/or novelty. The SR, which taps into the
construct of the ‘Behavioural Activation System’ (BAS), is associated with the con-
trol of approach behaviours induced by events evaluated as rewarding. The SR can
therefore be related to motivational aspects of impulsivity. The studies of interindi-
vidual differences in sensitivity to reinforcement benefitted from the recent devel-
opment of self-report measures of Gray’s constructs, such as the Sensitivity to
Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ; Torrubia, Avila,
Molto, & Caseras, 2001).
Two recent studies have used the SPSRQ in OCD patients and OCS-prone indi-
viduals (Fullana, Mataix-Cols, Caseras et al., 2004; Fullana, Mataix-Cols, Trujillo et
al., 2004). In accordance with Gray’s predictions, Fullana and colleagues showed that
individuals with subclinical OCS (N = 25) and OCD patients (N = 56) reported a
significantly higher SP level than controls. These results remain unchanged even after
controlling for depression and anxiety. A closer look at these findings (Fullana,
Mataix-Cols, Trujillo et al., 2004) reveals a small increase in SR in both OCS samples
compared to their respective controls. However, this difference did not reach an
acceptable level of significance, possibly because of a lack of statistical power. This
same conclusion also applied to a SPSRQ dataset of 56 OCD-hoarding patients
(Fullana, Mataix-Cols, Caseras et al., 2004). In summary, only a few studies evaluate
Gray’s personality dimensions in OCS-prone individuals. These studies corroborate
the assumption that OCS is associated with a marked SP, suggesting an anxiety dispo-
sition. However, they remain inconclusive concerning the impulsivity disposition
accounted for by SR. Yet, it cannot be excluded that this latter questionable finding is
due to methodological limits, for instance, the sample size or the binomial, instead of
the dimensional assessment of SR that could have underestimated the importance of
the phenomenon. Moreover, SP and SR have not yet been studied in the framework
Trauma and Obsession
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of a diathesis-stress model of OCS, leaving unexplored the role of sensitivity to rein-
forcement on emotional outcome after traumatic experiences.
In accordance with a diathesis-stress model of OCD, the current study examined
the relationship between trauma and OCS in a community sample by assuming that
this relationship is moderated by SP. A nonclinical sample of undergraduate stu-
dents was selected. Studies show that obsessions and compulsions are normal phe-
nomena occurring in nonclinical populations (Muris, Merckelbach, & Clavan,
1997). Thus, community samples are commonly considered valid analogues of OCD
patients (Mataix-Cols, Vallejo, & Sanchez-Turet, 2000).
Our research extends Fullana and colleague’s studies (2004) in several ways.
First, a new version of the SPSRQ scale developed by Lardi, Billieux, d’Acremont,
and Van der Linden (2008) was used. The new version removed 13 problematic
items from the original version by Torrubia et al. (2001) and asked participants to
report their agreement to items on 4-point scales instead of replying with a Yes–No
answer. Second, the whole population variance was considered by computing intra-
individual instead of intergroup effects. Finally, a severity score for lifetime adverse
event exposure was calculated.
By addressing these methodological issues, the current study considered the fol-
lowing predictions. First, in accordance with previous studies we expected a correla-
tion between trauma and OCS severity (i.e., Coles & Horng, 2006; Coles et al.,
2008; Cromer et al., 2007a, 2007b), and between SP and OCS severity (i.e., Fullana
et al., 2004). Second, in line with previous data on impulsivity in OCS (i.e.,
Summerfeldt et al., 2004; Van der Linden et al., 2005; Zermatten et al., 2008 ), we
also expected a correlation between SR and OCS severity. Finally, in accordance
with a diathesis-stress model of OCS (i.e., Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1999), we
anticipated that SP and/or SR would moderate the relation between trauma and
OCS severity above and beyond the variance explained by depression.
Method
Population
The current sample included 122 undergraduate students (107 females) from the
University of Geneva. Participants ranged from 18 to 45 years of age, with a mean
age of 22.93 years (SD = 4.76). All were fluent French speakers and volunteered to
participate in the study for course credit.
Measures
Lifetime exposure to adverse events (Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale — French
adaptation; PDS-F; Hearn, Ceschi, Brillon, & Van der Linden, 2010). The
PDS-F is an extension of the trauma checklist of the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale
(PDS; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997). The PDS presents a trauma checklist
of 11 very distressing incidents (i.e., serious accident, sexual assault, life-threatening
illness) and 1 open item. The PDS-F checklist includes 25 stressful events extend-
ing the original PDS checklist with 14 supplementary adverse events (i.e., difficult
childbirth, abortion or miscarriage, divorce, separation of parents). These supple-
mentary events were incorporated in the PDS-F from a catalog of residual traumatic
events reported in previous studies by a sample of nonclinical participants (David,
Ceschi, Billieux, & Van der Linden, 2008). In response to each adverse event, par-
ticipants were asked to rate its lifetime frequency on a 4-point scale ranging from 0
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(Not experienced) to 3 (Experienced 3 times or more), and its subjective degree of
stress on an 8 point-scale ranging from 0 (Not stressful at all) to 7 (Extremely stress-
ful). For each event, a severity score was calculated by multiplying event frequency
by stress intensity. A mean value per participant was computed by averaging sever-
ity scores across endorsed events. In our sample, the PDS-F presented good internal
consistency (α = .71).
Obsessive–compulsive severity: Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory — Revised (OCI-
R; Foa et al., 2002); French version by Zermatten, Van der Linden, Jermann,
and Ceschi (2006). The OCI-R includes 18 items describing a variety of OCS. By
reference to each item, participants are asked to report their degree of distress on a 5-
point scale ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 4 (Extremely). The psychometric properties
of the original English (Foa et al., 2002) and French (Zermatten et al., 2006) ver-
sions of the OCI-R are excellent. In our study, the OCI-R presented good internal
consistency (α = .86).
Depression: Beck Depression Inventory, version 2 (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1998). The 21-item BDI-II inventory provides a self-report measure of depressed
mood. The psychometric qualities of BDI-II have been widely demonstrated (Beck et
al., 1998). BDI-II presented an excellent internal consistency (α = .91) in our sample.
Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward. (SPSRQ; Torrubia et al.,
2001; short French version by Lardi et al., 2008). The short SPSRQ version is a
35-item questionnaire elaborated on Gray’s personality model (Gray &
McNaughton, 2000). It consists of two subscales, the Sensitivity to Punishment
scale (SP), and the Sensitivity to Reward scale (SR). The 18 items of the SP sub-
scale were developed to assess behavioural inhibition in situations involving the
possibility of aversive consequences and threats (i.e., ‘Do you prefer not to ask for
something when you are not sure you will obtain it?’). The 17 items of the SR sub-
scale capture sensitivity to signals of reward in relation to approach behaviours and
hedonism (i.e., ‘Does the good prospect of obtaining money motivate you strongly
to do some things?’). Each item was rated on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (No) to
4 (Yes). SP and SR scores were obtained by summing corresponding item values.
The English and French versions of the SPSRQ showed good reliability and validity
(Lardi et al., 2008). Good internal consistency was established for both subscales in
our sample (SP: α = .87; SR: α = .80).
Trauma and Obsession
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TABLE 1
Cronbach’s α, Means and Standard Deviations for Study Variables, and Zero-Order
Pearson’s Correlations Among Them
α N valid M (SD) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Adverse events .71 122 1.905 (1.284) —
2. Depression .91 114 8.430 (7.862) .197* —
3. Sen. Reward .80 116 37.108 (7.106) .065 .144 —
4. Sen. Punishment .87 116 43.457 (9.032) .108 .444** .144 —
5. OCI-R .86 116 15.310 (9.412) .240** .286** .360** .346**
Note: N = 122 (pairwise valid 108 < n < 116); *p < .05; **p < .01
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Results
As indicated in Table 1, the number of valid cases differed between variables (n =
114–122). Thus, missing data were excluded pairwise. Preliminary statistical analy-
ses showed that basic assumptions were well-respected without further need of data
transformation, except for the z score conversion recommended for the calculation
of interaction terms.
Table 1 displays zero-order Pearson’s correlations between adverse events,
depression, SR, SP and OCS. As expected, individuals reporting a greater number
of adverse events also tend to endorse more severe OCS, r(116) = .240, p = .005.
A hierarchical regression analysis was used to predict OCI-R as a function of dis-
positional (SP, SR) and situational factors (PDS-F) as well as their interactions. The
variables were forced into the regression in 4 steps. Given the strong association of
depression with SP and SR, depression was controlled by entering the BDI-II score
in step 1. The two dispositional factors were forced into the regression in step 2, and
the lifetime exposure to adverse events in step 3. In the final step, the two interac-
tion terms between exposure to adverse events and each dispositional score (SP, SR)
were added to assess moderation effects.
As illustrated in Table 2, the regression showed that OCS severity is signifi-
cantly predicted by SP and SR, even after having partialised the variance accounted
for by depression. More precisely, results from step 2 reveal that SP and SR jointly
predicted a significant amount of variance in the OCI-R, (ΔR2 = .151; F(2,104) =
10.215; p = .000). Individuals who reported a higher SP level (β = .243; t = 2.519; 
p = .013) as well as a higher SR level (β = .306; t = 3.511; p = .001) were also those
who suffered from more severe OCS. The third regression step proved that exposure
to adverse events makes an additional contribution in the prediction of OCS
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TABLE 2
Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting OCS Severity by Control Variable (Depression)
and Predictors (Sensitivity to Punishment, Sensitivity to Reward, Exposure to Adverse
Events, and Their Interactions)
Dependent
Variable OCI-R Predictors Beta t Sig. R2 R2 Change
Step 1 Depression .286 3.068 .003 .082**
Step 2 Depression .134 1.391 .167 .232** .151**
Sen. reward .306 3.511 .001
Sen. punishment .243 2.519 .013
Step 3 Depression .102 1.061 .291 .262** .029*
Sen. reward .300 3.488 .001
Sen. punishment .266 2.756 .007
Adverse events .239 2.516 .013
Step 4 Depression .063 0.666 .507 .311** .050*
Sen. reward .276 3.268 .001
Sen. punishment .268 2.880 .005
Adverse events .167 1.975 .051
AE * SP .030 0.359 .720
AE * SR .222 2.607 .011
Note: **p < .01;* p < .05; AE = adverse events; SP = sensitivity to punishment; SR = sensitivity to
reward. N = 122, pairwise case deletion. 
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 severity (ΔR2 =.029; F(1,103) = 4.087; p = .046) and suggests that individuals
encountering more adverse events tend to suffer from more severe OCS (β = .175; 
t = 2.022; p = .046) independently of their reinforcement sensitivity and level 
of depression.
The interaction terms entered in the final equation made a supplementary contri-
bution in predicting OCS severity (ΔR2 = .050; F(2,101) = 3.652; p = .029). In this
model, OCS severity was predicted by lifetime exposure to adverse events (β = .167; 
t = 1.975; p = .051), SP (β = .268; t = 2.880; p = .005), and SR (β = .276; t = 3.268; 
p = .001). Furthermore, the interaction effect between SR and adverse events
 contributed significantly to explain variance in OCS severity (β = .222; t = 2.607; 
p = .011).
Figure 1 shows that the exposure to adverse events did not result in any residual
change in OCS severity for those reporting a low SR (β = -.003; t = -.021; 
p = .983). On the contrary, for individuals who reported a marked SR, exposure to
adverse events was correlated with OCS severity with an increasing standardized
simple slope of β = .205 (t = 2.453; p = .016) and β =.413 (t = 3.661; p = .000) for
participants reporting a medium and high SR level, respectively.
Discussion
The current study investigated the role of adverse life events on OCS expression
within a diathesis-stress model that considers the moderation effects of two core
Trauma and Obsession
Behaviour Change
Low (-1.00)
Medium (.00)
High (1.00)
Sensitivity to Reward
FIGURE 1
Effect between sensitivity to reward and lifetime exposure to adverse life events on OCS
severity.
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1375/bech.28.2.75
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:29:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
personality dispositions formulated by Gray et al. (2000): SP and SR. In accordance
with previous studies, OCS severity was predicted by the lifetime exposure to
adverse events (Coles & Horng, 2006; Coles et al., 2008; Cromer et al., 2007a,
2007b), and sensitivity to punishment (Fullana et al., 2004). Thus, individuals who
encounter frequent and distressing experiences, like those reporting a pronounced
sensitivity to punishment, are at risk to develop OCS. Contrary to a diathesis-stress
model of OCS, the present study shows, however, that SP does not enhance the
impact of adverse life events. Accordingly, an additive rather than a multiplicative
model seems to be a more accurate description of OCS variance as a function of
adverse events exposure and SP. Despite this observation, a diathesis-stress model of
OCS was found to be an acceptable approximation of OCS variance as a function
of SR disposition. It is worth nothing that exposure to adverse life events predicts
OCS severity particularly for individuals reporting an elevated SR, namely those
motivated by incentive and reward. These findings are discussed in four points.
First, the current data indicate that the lifetime exposure to adverse events pre-
dicts OCS severity. This relation is moderate in size, but compatible with previous
evidence (Coles & Horng, 2006; Coles et al., 2008; Cromer et al., 2007a, 2007b). We
extended previous findings by showing that exposure to adverse events predicts
residual change in OCS severity above and beyond the variance accounted for by
depression and reinforcement sensitivity. Given OCS heterogeneity (Mataix-Cols,
Rosario-Campos, & Leckman, 2005), a more rigorous distinction of OCS profiles in
further studies may be useful for identifying more robust OCS-trauma associations. For
instance, Cromer and colleagues (2007b) found that the occurrence of traumatic
experiences was linked to checking and ordering but not to other OCS subtypes.
Second, the current data on SP fit an additive model of OCS whereby the anxi-
ety disposition (captured by a high SP score) predicts OCS regardless of event expo-
sure. Likewise, a heightened exposure to adverse life events may constitute a
vulnerability factor of OCS independently of individual anxiety dispositions. In
other words, OCS prevails in individuals with a high SP whether or not they have
been exposed to adverse events. Thus, the current study suggests that individuals
reporting a high SP score, even if motivated to avoid threatening situations, tend to
focus their attention on future events that could be threatening regardless of the
likelihood of their occurrence. Thus, SP does not seem to be instrumental in con-
trolling the uncertainty of possible adverse consequences. Similar unpredicted con-
clusions have been described for other anxious cognitions such as ‘worries’
(Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994) or ‘intolerance to uncer-
tainty’ (Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004). These anxious cognitions have been
found to be inefficient in moderating the impact of stressful events on emotional
adjustment (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). This result is consistent with Fullana et
al.’s (2004) findings and indicates that a high SP should be considered a vulnerabil-
ity factor for OCS, independently of life experiences.
Third, the current study indicates that among individuals who reported moderate-
to-high SR scores, exposure to adverse events is associated with more severe OCS.
Conversely, adverse events do not result in any residual change in OCS severity for
those with low SR scores. These data conflict with results published by Fullana’s
group, based on evaluations of between-subgroup differences. These studies suggested
that OCD subgroups did not endorse more SR than their matched controls (Fullana,
Mataix-Cols, Caseras et al., 2004; Fullana, Mataix-Cols, Trujillo et al., 2004). A closer
look to Fullana’s findings indicates, however, that SR scoring tended to differentiate
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the subgroups. Congruent to the current results, Fullana et al.’s OCD-prone subgroups
have a propensity to report more pronounced sensitivity to reward than other persons.
Some methodological limitations (i.e., sample size, suboptimal SR scale, unidentified
psychometric properties of SR) could have deflated the estimation of SR in Fullana et
al.’s studies. Although additional replication is needed to establish robust conclusions,
our finding already reveals the importance of impulsivity, and more specifically its
reward-driven component, in the understanding of OCS.
Previous studies on impulsivity in OCS have mainly focused on rash impulsive-
ness, namely the inability to inhibit prepotent responses promoting compulsive
behaviours (e.g., Van der Linden et al., 2005). Few studies have assessed a reward
drive attitude compatible with Gray and McNaughton’ (2000) ‘Behaviour
Activation System’ or Torrubia et al.’s (2001) SR scale. Our findings argue that
OCS can be related to the reward drive level of impulsivity activated by a context
of adverse experiences. In accordance with this suggestion, scholars have recently
begun to recognise that aspects of motivation, such as a sense of ‘incompleteness’,
accompanied the ‘not just right experience’, may be important in explaining differ-
ent aspects of the compulsive behaviours. ‘Incompleteness’ is defined as ‘an inner
sense of imperfection, connected with the perception that actions or intentions
have been incompletely achieved’ (Pietrefesa & Coles, 2008; p. 224). Recently,
Pietrefesa and Coles (2008) provided strong support to the assumption that, in addi-
tion to harm avoidance, incompleteness has to be considered a key motivation
underlying compulsive behaviour in OCD, especially in association with the self-
prescribed aspects of perfectionism. This is in line with the long-established clinical
observation that OCD patients present an inflated sense of responsibility and a
desire for perfectionism (Rachman, 1993; Salkovskis et al., 1999). For Salkovskis
(1999), beliefs of responsibility involve socialisation processes that favour the devel-
opment of an ideal, perfect self, and that trauma undermines confidence and
increases feelings of guilt. The current study suggests that the heightened sense of
responsibility and the ‘not just right experience’ commonly described in OCD can
be explained as a motivation to compensate a subjective impression of reward
deficit triggered by unfavourable external circumstances. This may be connected
with a critical assessment of one’s own behaviours, with a fear of making bad deci-
sions, of not being in accordance with a self-ideal, or of having to face potential
negative outcomes (Shalev & Sulkowski, 2009). Despite its theoretical and clinical
interest, the relationship between SR, adverse experiences and OCS has to be inter-
preted with caution because a high level of SR may intrinsically include a propen-
sity to act out (captured, for instance, by SR items like ‘Do you like displaying your
physical abilities even though this may involve danger?’). Thus, it cannot be
excluded that individuals reporting a high score of SR may, at the same time, be
more inclined to put themselves in potentially dangerous circumstances. The design
of the current study prevents any interpretation of the causal role of SR, trauma and
OCS. Aside from a longitudinal study design, research distinguishing between
‘ideal’ and ‘acting out’ aspects of SR may shed light on this issue in the future.
Finally, we have to acknowledge that the current PDS-F checklist is limited to
events that generally occur during adulthood. Lochner et al. (2007) observed that
in a group of 83 OCD patients, OCS severity was associated with self-reported
accounts of child neglect and abuse. Interestingly, Mathews et al. (2008) demon-
strated that childhood trauma, particularly emotional neglect, plays a role in the
expression of dysfunctional levels of OCS in students, possibly through a personality
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trait of consciousness. This finding raises two important concerns. On the one
hand, it suggests that further studies on OCS should integrate an extensive assess-
ment of childhood adverse experiences. On the other hand, it indicates that other
personality dispositions than the ones we studied (SP, SR) should be informative in
delineating the boundaries of a diathesis-stress model of OCS.
This study presents limitations that preclude its generalisation. First, the absence
of a longitudinal design rules out the possibility to draw firm conclusions about
causality. Second, our sample was mainly constituted by females. More representa-
tive gender recruitment would allow conclusions about possible gender effects.
Third, our results are drawn on a nonclinical sample. Even if this is current practice
(Mataix-Cols, et al., 2000; Muris et al., 1997), direct generalisations to clinical
OCD patients are not possible before formal replications with OCD patients. Four,
the present study relies on self-report measures that can be biased by social-desir-
ability and awareness accessibility. These limits can be critical in the assessment of
traumatic and affective phenomena that deserve more indirect measures (like, for
instance, behaviour observation). Finally, our measure of adverse event exposure
includes items of physical and sexual abuse without specifically identifying child-
hood maltreatment that has previously been shown to be of interest in OCD
(Lochner et al., 2002, 2007; Mathews et al., 2008). Despite these limitations, the
current study sheds new light on a diathesis-stress model of OCS which addresses
the complex role of dispositional-situational interactions. Future work is obviously
needed to precisely determine the interplay of these factors in the onset and main-
tenance of OCS subgroups over time.
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